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Abstract
We model the firm’s optimal choice of capital and goodness subject to financial
constraints. Managers and shareholders derive benefits over profits and social responsibility. Goodness is costly and its marginal benefit is finite; as a result, less-constrained
firms spend more on goodness. We verify that less-constrained firms do indeed have
higher social responsibility scores. Our empirical analysis addresses identification issues that have long plagued the corporate social responsibility literature, establishing
the causality of this relationship using a natural experiment. During the technology
bubble, previously constrained firms experienced a temporary relaxation of their constraints and their goodness scores also temporarily increased relative to their previously
unconstrained peers. This convergence applies to all components of the goodness scores
such as community and employee relations and environmental responsibility but not
governance.
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1.

Introduction

Even though Milton Friedman (1970) declared in a biting op-ed piece in the New York
Times that the only social responsibility of corporations is to make money, firms continue to
invest significant resources to mitigate the externality-related concerns associated with their
production. Such concerns range from environmental pollution to employment standards
perceived to be unfair.1 Precise numbers on how much firms spend to deal with externalities
are hard to come by because of a lack of proper accounting and because such practices are
intimately connected to how firms set up their production processes.2 But anecdotal evidence
suggests that some firms, especially large corporations, routinely invest hundreds of millions
of dollars annually on developing energy conservation practices, employee and community
development programs or other altruistic endeavors.3
Many theories have been proposed to explain such firm behavior. These theories can be
broadly grouped into two categories: stories in which spending on goodness increases profits
versus stories in which this spending derives from non-profit motives. Corporate goodness
can boost a firm’s bottom line by delivering “warm-glow” to its consumers, improving employee efficiency, lessening conflicts among stakeholders, mitigating litigation risk, deterring
potential regulation, signaling product quality or as investor relations in dealing with product or capital market boycotts by socially responsible consumers or investors.4 Non-profit
motives for corporate responsibility include the firm acting as a delegated philanthropist
1

Some notable cases are Nike’s use of child labor in developing countries, Walmart’s low wage practices
and most recently the poor safety standards of British Petroleum.
2
For instance, corporations increasingly use evaluation systems and compensation programs that include
the social performance of managers. See Kaplan and Norton (1996) for a discussion.
3
In 2009, Intel allocated $100 million for global education programs and energy conservation efforts such
as the purchase of renewable energy certificates. In 2007, General Electric gave $160 million to community
and employee philanthropic programs and has earmarked billions more for developing eco-friendly products.
See Delevingne (2009) for a description of these projects.
4
For reviews of these strands of theories, see Benabou and Tirole (2010) and Heal (2005). Profit motives for goodness often come under the heading of “Doing Well by Doing Good”, which was featured in
a well-read article by The Economist in 2005. A number of theories of profits from goodness implicitly
rely on the idea that firms are well-positioned to deliver warm-glow feelings (Becker (1974) and Andreoni
(1989)) to consumers. See for instance Besley and Ghatak (2005) for a model which includes such strategic
complementarities involving goodness in the production function. See Baron (2001) for a model of strategic
deterrence of regulation through using corporate goodness.
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when the firm faces a lower cost for giving than shareholders or agency rationales in which
managers consume corporate goodness as a perk or use it to entrench themselves by currying
favor with important stakeholders.5
There is little evidence for which if any of these factors are important for explaining the
variation in corporate goodness in the cross-section or over time. The consensus across many
empirical studies is that there is no significant correlation between corporate responsibility
and measures of firm financial performance (whether earnings or stock returns).6 However,
cross-firm empirical studies have been plagued by a potential endogeneity problem: financial
performance might be an important determinant of corporate responsibility decisions.
In this paper, we take a different approach toward modeling and analyzing this old
but increasingly important and controversial topic. The key idea is to model spending on
goodness in an environment where firms face financial constraints. We take as exogenous the
motives for goodness (which might be profit or non-profit driven) and financial constraints.
We solve for the firm’s optimal level of capital and goodness. We test the model using
a natural experiment in which the excessively high valuations of the Internet bubble of
1996-2000 spilled over even into non-dot-com firms and as a result temporarily relaxed their
financial constraints. We look at whether these constrained versus unconstrained firms’
investments in goodness, measured using corporate goodness scores, temporarily converged
during the Internet bubble period.
Our model has the following key features. The firm is endowed with a utility or benefit
function over profits and goodness. The utility function satisfies the usual neoclassical conditions (increasing and concave) and depending on the functional form can capture a number of
the motives for goodness (both profit and non-profit) described above. In our set-up, profits
and goodness can be either complements or substitutes in the utility function of the firm;
5

The perspective in Friedman (1970) is that corporate goodness is managerial entrenchment in which
managers use corporate cash to further their own interests, whether it be for their own philanthropy or to
entrench themselves further. See Tirole (2001) for a discussion of how goodness is related to governance.
6
Margolis, Elfenbein and Walsh (2007) conduct a meta-analysis of literally hundreds of studies on this
relationship. They find that across these studies the average effect is roughly zero and is statistically
insignificant.
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though for purposes of exposition, it is easier to think about them as complements. Output
is generated by a neoclassical (increasing and concave) production function of capital, with a
technology parameter that shifts the marginal productivity of capital. Importantly, goodness
comes at a cost to profits.
The manager then optimizes the firm’s benefit function over capital and goodness subject
to a financial constraint that the cost of capital and goodness equal the firm’s cash on hand.
A firm with little cash on hand is a proxy for a firm that is more equity dependent and
less able to raise funds. We assume that the marginal product of capital at zero is infinity;
whereas, the marginal benefit of goodness at zero is finite. This assumption means that the
firm only considers spending on goodness after it has generated positive output. We also
impose a non-negativity constraint on goodness because otherwise a very constrained firm
will want to make goodness negative to fund capital investments.
The solution has an intuitive form and can be separated into three regions depending
on the level of firm cash or the degree of financial constraints. In the first or unconstrained
region, the firm has enough cash to fund its first-best level of capital and goodness. In the
mild-constrained region, a firm has enough resources to do some goodness spending. In the
very constrained region, the firm does not have enough funding to achieve its first-best level
of capital and it spends nothing on goodness. As a result, we have the prediction that less
constrained firms spend more on goodness.
We test this prediction using data on scores of corporate social responsibility provided
by Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini (KLD). Companies are evaluated based on a number
of criteria, including community relations, employee relations, diversity of the workforce,
environmental protection, product quality and governance. Our sample consists of S&P 500
firms observed yearly from 1991 to 2008. Firms are scored in terms of concerns and strengths
for these six criteria. We consider two measures of corporate concerns and strengths. The
first is the simple sum of the scores for strengths and concerns. The second is a measure
obtained through factor analysis. These two measures are correlated, though interestingly,
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the factor analysis approach puts zero weight on governance when measuring strengths. We
take the difference between strengths and concerns (using both the simple sum scores and
the factor scores) to be the measures of a firm’s goodness. We measure a firm’s financial
constraint using a variety of measures from the literature including the Kaplan and Zingales
(1997) score, share repurchases and bond ratings.
We find that less financially constrained firms indeed have higher goodness scores, using
both of our measures of corporate goodness and all of our financial constraint measures.
But there is a question of whether this strong correlation is causal. We exploit a natural
experiment to buttress the argument that financial constraints cause firms to invest in less
corporate goodness. Our identification strategy builds on Baker et al. (2003) and Campello
and Graham (2007) who argue that the dot-com bubble relaxed financing constraints even
for non-dot-com firms. They show that even non-Internet firms received excessively high
valuations and that those that were constrained issued equity to finance capital expenditures and to elevate their cash holdings. If there is a causal connection between financial
constraints and corporate goodness, then we expect that during the technology bubble of
1996-2000 previously constrained non-technology firms would increase their corporate goodness relative to other non-technology firms compared to other periods in our sample. Our
identification strategy differs from these papers in terms of the set-up and its emphasis that
this convergence in goodness scores was indeed temporary and occurred during the dotcom period. As such, we are able to rule out alternative explanations related to coincident
trends. We conduct a variety of robustness checks, including showing this result for all of
our financial constraint measures.
Finally, we examine which components of our corporate goodness scores are most sensitive
to these changes in financial constraints. We first find that we obtain similar results when we
define corporate goodness based only on KLD strengths instead of strengths minus concerns.
Then we show how financial constraints affect the behavior of firms using the six KLD
components used to create the aggregate goodness score separately. Easing constraints
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increase a firm’s goodness within all six of these components except for corporate governance;
the increase in corporate goodness does not appear to be confined to one or two categories.
When we examine the actions of firms even more finely by looking at the sub-categories of
these six components, we find that two of the most sensitive corporate actions to financial
constraints are charitable giving and profit sharing payments to employees. These findings
suggest that our results are not simply a manifestation of perk spending. They are also
consistent with Tirole (2001) who points out that governance is fundamentally different
from goodness since a firm with strong governance will not be able to invest in goodness to
appease various stakeholders.
In sum, our paper shows that goodness is costly and determined by a firm’s financial
status. It proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present a simple model of a manager’s
capital and goodness choices in the presence of financial constraints and an exogenously
given utility or objective function. In Section 3, we describe the data. We present the
empirical results in Section 4 and conclude in Section 5. Details of the proofs for the model
are in the Appendix.

2.

Model

We develop a static model of the firm’s choices of capital (K) and goodness (G). The
firm’s output is solely a function of production, which is given by the production function
αf (K). f (K) is a neoclassical production function with the following properties: f 0 (0) = ∞,
f 0 (K) > 0, and f 00 (K) < 0. α is a technology parameter that captures the productivity of
capital. For simplicity, we assume that the cost of one unit of capital is 1 and that the cost
of one unit of goodness is also 1. Then let Γ denote the amount of cash needed to finance
investments in capital and goodness (i.e., the firm faces the financing constraint K +G ≤ Γ).
A low Γ is a proxy for a firm that has little cash, that finds it difficult to raise funds in debt
markets, and that is more equity dependent. As we elaborate on below, we can think of Γ
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as being shifted by aggregate shocks such as the Internet bubble which made financing more
accessible (i.e. a higher Γ) through excessively high valuations that the firm can then exploit
by issuing over-priced equity.7
The firm derives utility over profits and the amount spent on goodness G given by the
following utility function:
u(αf (K) − K − G, G)

(1)

We assume that u is increasing in each argument and that D2 u is a negative definite matrix.
This utility function is a flexible form meant to capture varied motives for goodness; it can
be interpreted as the utility function of shareholders or the manager. Under a non-strategic
(i.e. non-profit related) motivation, u is the utility that shareholders or the manager get
from delegated giving; under an agency interpretation, u is the utility that the manager
derives from giving or perhaps from entrenchment. Importantly, u can also be interpreted as
providing the payoffs for the firm from investing in goodness for strategic or profit reasons.
A benchmark case is where u(·, ·) = f (K) − K − G + v(G) and v(G) satisfies the following
properties: v 0 (0) < ∞, v 0 (G) > 0 and v 00 (G) < 0. The firm derives the net benefit v(G) − G
from goodness that can be interpreted as dollars to the bottom line; perhaps goodness
increases profits through some reputation effect or insulates the firm from litigation risk.
We will also place a limit on the degree substitution between profits and goodness in the
utility function by assuming that
u12 ≥ u11 .
Note that we assume the usual nice properties regarding utility function and hence u11 < 0.
u12 measures the substitutability of profits and goodness. If u12 > 0, then goodness and
profits are complements; while if u12 < 0 then profits and goodness are substitutes. If
u12 = 0, then profits and goodness are separable in the utility function of the firm.8
7

This point has been already formalized in Baker et al. (2003) and we use the simplest model for expositional reasons.
8
It is easiest to think of our setting as one in which goodness and profits complements, but we do allow
for substitution, provided it is not too strong.
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The firm then has the following constrained optimization problem:

max u(αf (K) − K − G, G)

(2)

K +G≤Γ

(3)

G≥0

(4)

K,G

subject to

and

Because f 0 (0) = ∞, we know that the optimal K is greater than zero whenever Γ > 0 and
so there is no need to impose a non-negativity condition on K. But we do need to impose
a non-negativity condition on G because a firm with a financial constraint may potentially
want to choose a negative G to loosen that constraint. In fact, we assume that u2 (·, 0) is
finite; so whenever Γ is small, the firm would be tempted to choose a negative G.
The solution has three regions defined by the level of cash Γ. The first region, Region
1, is given by Γ ≥ ΓF B , where ΓF B is the level of cash that finances the first-best levels of
investments in capital and goodness and where the firm is unconstrained (i.e., the constraint
given by equation (3) is not binding). Let the optimal unconstrained solution be denoted by
(K F B , GF B ). The solution K F B satisfies the following equation:

αf 0 (K F B ) = 1

(5)

Equation (5) is the familiar first-order condition that the marginal product of capital equal
00

to the marginal cost of capital, which we assume is equal to 1. And because f < 0, we
know that K F B is unique.
Furthermore, if

−u1 (αf (K F B ) − K F B , 0) + u2 (αf (K F B ) − K F B , 0) > 0
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(6)

then X F B > 0 solves

−u1 (αf (K F B ) − K F B − X F B , X F B ) + u2 (αf (K F B ) − K F B − X F B , X F B ) = 0.

(7)

Equation (7) gives the first-order condition that determines GF B . It states that at the
unconstrained solution, the marginal benefit of goodness (u2 (αf (K F B ) − K F B − GF B , GF B ))
equals the marginal cost of goodness (u1 (αf (K F B ) − K F B − GF B , GF B )), which is simply
the lost marginal utility of profit. We will assume that inequality (6) holds; otherwise there
is no investment in goodness at the first best. The negative definiteness of D2 u guarantees
that GF B is unique. The first-best level of cash is then given by

ΓF B = GF B + K F B .

(8)

We will now consider the solution when the financial constraint is binding. If Γ < ΓF B ,
then inequality (3) binds. The solution then is further characterized by a unique cut-off
value Γ∗ < ΓF B . The second region, Region 2, is defined by Γ∗ < Γ < ΓF B . Here, financial
constraints bind but G > 0, G = Γ − K and an increase in Γ leads to an increase in both K
and G. The third region, Region 3, is defined by Γ ≤ Γ∗ . In this region, financial constraints
bind and G = 0. An increase in Γ only leads to an increase in K and no change in G.
Intuitively, because the marginal product of capital is infinite at zero, a very constrained
firm will spend its resources on capital and nothing on goodness. Only when its financial
constraint is not very binding will it consider then spending an extra dollar on goodness. As
Γ increases and the firm has more financial resources, it begins to spend on goodness.
These results are summarized in the following Theorem, the proof of which we complete
in the Appendix.
Theorem 1. For an unconstrained firm, Γ > ΓF B , the firm invests in the first best levels
of capital and goodness. There exists a unique cut-off value Γ∗ such that for Γ∗ < Γ < ΓF B ,
G > 0, G = Γ − K and G and K increase with Γ and for Γ ≤ Γ∗ , G = 0 and only K
8

increases with Γ.
A firm’s financial constraint status is one of the key parameters of our model. Theorem
1 provides a complete guide to how all the variables of interest vary with this parameter.
Using Theorem 1, we have the following predictions.
Prediction 1. Less financially constrained firms spend more on goodness.
We will test this prediction using measures of corporate goodness and standard measures of
financial constraints. We will start by examining simple correlations between firm financial
constraints and corporate goodness. Then we will help determine the causal relationship
between these constraints and goodness using the natural experiment from the Internet
bubble and the following prediction of the model.
Prediction 2. When aggregate financing constraints ease, the increase in the goodness of
financially constrained firms should be bigger than unconstrained or less-constrained firms.
The reason is simply that unconstrained firms have already made their first-best levels of
investments in goodness and hence even if their constraints loosened, they would not change
their investments. This is consistent with Baker et al. (2003) and Campello and Graham
(2007) who find that unconstrained firms did not change their investment levels nor issue
more equity during the Internet period. Prediction 2 is the basis of our natural experiment in
which we expect to see a temporary convergence of goodness investments between financially
constrained and unconstrained firms during the Internet bubble period of 1996-2010. Indeed,
the comparison still holds if we compared constrained versus less constrained firms as less
constrained firms would need to increase their investments in goodness by proportionally
less than constrained ones who are very far from the first best.

9

3.

Measures of Goodness and Financial Constraints

3.1.

Data

Our study uses data from three main sources. Ratings of corporate social responsibility
are from the Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini, & Co. (KLD) database. Stock prices and shares
outstanding are from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and all accounting
variables are from Compustat. KLD’s coverage of S&P 500 firms starts in 1991; our analysis
uses KLD information for S&P 500 firms from 1991 to 2008.
The KLD ratings are built on a point-by-point assessment of companies along a number
of dimensions. We focus on ratings in six KLD categories: Community Activities, Diversity, Employee Relations, Environmental Record, Products, and Corporate Governance. To
understand how these ratings are calculated, we will describe how KLD measures a firm’s
rating for the Communities Activities and Environmental Record categories. KLD classifies
four Community Activities strengths: “Charitable Giving’, “Innovative Giving”, “Support
for Housing”, and “Other Community Strengths”. A firm gets a score of one if they perform
well in a particular criterion and zero otherwise. There are also four Community Activities
concerns: “Investment Controversies”, “Negative Economic Impact”, “Tax Disputes”, and
“Other Community Concerns”. A firm gets a score of 1 if they have a problem in one of these
four sub-categories and zero otherwise. For example, if a company has no strengths or concerns, it receives a Community Activities strength and concern score of zero. Alternatively,
if it performs “Charitable Giving” and “Innovative Giving” but also has “Tax Disputes”, its
strengths score is 2 and concerns score is 1.
For Environmental Record, there are five components of strengths: “Delivers Products or
Services that Help Protect the Environment”, “Strong Pollution Prevention Program”,“Uses
Recycled Materials or Major Player Recycling Industry”, “Energy Efficiency Leader” and
“Other Strengths”. The potential of one point for each strength means a firm can have a
minimum score of zero to a maximum score of 5. There are six components of concerns:
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whether a firm has “Hazardous Waste Sites or Waste Management Violations”, “Environmental Regulation Violations (Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, et al.)”, “Manufacturer of
Ozone-Depleting Chemicals”, “Emissions of Toxic Chemicals (from TRI reports)”, “Manufacturer of Agricultural Chemicals” and “Other Concerns”. One point for each concern
means that a firm can have a minimum score of 0 to a maximum score of 6. Ratings for the
other categories are calculated similarly.
The scores from these six categories for a firm are summed to arrive at a yearly measures
of Total Strengths and Total Concerns. We only use scores for sub-categories that were
available throughout our sample period.9 For example, there is a Community Activities
subcategory called “Indigenous Peoples Relations” that was introduced in 2000. We omit it
to allow scores to be comparable over time. There are also two additional categories tracked
by KLD beyond the six we consider: Human Rights and Controversial Business. There are
no Human Rights subcategories available throughout our sample period so we again omit it
to keep our measures comparable over time. Controversial Business pertains to whether the
firm is in a controversial line of business. Because there is little a firm can do to change its
line of business, we also exclude it from our analysis.

3.2.

Factor Analysis and Alternative Measures of Goodness

In addition to Total Strengths and Total Concerns, we also construct Factor Score Strengths
and Factor Score Concerns by performing factor analysis on the scores from the six components of the KLD ratings described above and taking the first factor score for strengths and
concerns. Total Strengths and Total Concerns puts equal weight across the six categories.
There is no reason to think that the categories need to be equal weighted. Factor analysis is
one way to let the data speak.10 Table 1 reports the factor loadings from the factor analysis
that is used to construct the Factor Score Strengths and Factor Score Concerns.
9

We have also done our empirical work including sub-categories that are added or deleted during our
sample period. We obtain very similar results using these alternative corporate goodness measures.
10
We have also tried a closely related approach of principal components analysis and found similar results.
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Panel A reports the results for strengths. The factor analysis places a zero weight on
the corporate governance strengths and shifts the remaining weight fairly equally across the
remaining five categories, with Diversity strengths getting the most weight (0.51) and the
remaining categories receiving a weights between about 0.20 and 0.40. The zero loading on
corporate governance is interesting since it says that at least in the domain of strengths,
corporate governance is different from the other attributes.
Panel B reports the results for concerns. Here, factor analysis places roughly equal weight
across all six categories. Corporate Governance and Diversity concerns get the lowest weight
of 0.18 and 0.19 respectively; Product concerns get the highest at 0.26. But the deviation
from equal-weighting is very slight in terms of concerns. As we show below in our empirical
analysis, using raw KLD scores or factor scores yield for the most part similar results.
We follow the literature and take the difference between strengths and concerns (using
both the simple sum scores and the factor scores) to be the measures of a firm’s goodness.
Raw Goodness is strengths minus concerns using the raw KLD data. Factor Score Goodness
is the strengths minus concerns using the factor scores.

3.3.

Measures of Financial Constraints

The literature has many established ways to measure a firm’s financial constraint. All the
measures are meant to capture the equity dependence of firms, but no measure is perfect.
Our strategy involves trying several financial constraint proxies. The first is the Kaplan and
Zingales (1997) index that is a weighted score that accounts for a variety of firm characteristics including variables such as firm cash, cashflow, leverage and a firm’s productivity
measured by a firm’s market-to-book ratio. Following Baker et al. (2003), we construct the
five variable KZ Score for each firm/year as the following linear combination:

KZScorei,t = −1.002CFi,t /Ai,t−1 − 39.368Di,t /Ai,t−1 − 1.315Ci,t /Ai,t−1 + 3.139Bi,t + 0.283Qi,t
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where CFi,t /Ai,t−1 is cash flow (Compustat Item 14+Item 18) over lagged assets (Item 6);
DIVi,t /Ai,t−1 is cash dividends (Item 21+Item 19) over assets; Ci,t /Ai,t−1 is cash balances
(Item 1) over start-of-the-year book assets (Item 6); book leverage, denoted by BLEVi,t ,
which is total debt divided by the sum of total debt and book equity ((Item 9+Item 34)/(Item
9+Item 34+Item 216)) measured at fiscal year-end, and Tobin’s Q is the market value of
equity (price times shares outstanding from CRSP) plus assets minus the book value of 16
equity (Item 60+Item 74) all over assets. We winsorize the ingredients of the index before
constructing it.11
This score measures a firm’s equity dependence as captured by its cash and leverage
ratios and also a firm’s productivity. More productive firms (α in our model) will be more
constrained (i.e. they are less likely to be in the unconstrained region) all else equal because
their first-best level of capital investment will be higher. A worrisome aspect of this measure
is that it uses a firm’s market-to-book ratio as a proxy for a firm’s average productivity
from Q-theory. But this is difficult since the market-to-book ratio also captures potential
mispricings. This interpretation is potentially problematic in our setting because earlier
work argues that the demand for goodness on the part of socially responsible investors has
a price effect in the direction of depressing the valuations of bad companies in favor of good
companies (see, Heinkel, Kraus and Zechner (2001), Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), Hong and
Kostovetsky (2009)). As such, we also consider two other measures of financial constraints.
Our second financial constraint measure is an indicator for whether or not a firm engages in stock repurchases: No Repurchase Indicator. We calculate a firm’s repurchases as
expenditure on the purchase of common and preferred stocks (Compustat Item 115) minus
preferred stock reduction (the first difference of Item 10). We then construct a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has no repurchases.12 Firms that engage in equity repurchases
11

For some firm/year observations, one or more of the five components used to construct the KZ score
will be missing. In those circumstances, we use a firm’s KZ score from the previous year. We obtain similar
results if we drop these observations instead of using previous values of the KZ score.
12
We parameterize the variable to turn on when a firm has no repurchases instead of when a firm has
repurchases to standardize all of our financial constraint variables so that higher values correspond to more
constrained firms.
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are presumably less equity dependent and hence less financially constrained.
Our final measure of firm financial constraints is a firm’s average bond rating. A lower
bond rating forces a firm to be more equity dependent and hence more financially constrained.
Using data from Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch, we take all of the bonds issued by a
firm and assign a numerical score to its rating from Moody’s.13 For each year, we take the
average of these numerical scores and merge these averages with the KLD data set.14 We
can confidently merge about three-quarters of the KLD sample with bond information, so
analysis using bond ratings will use a smaller data sample than the rest of the analysis.15

3.4.

Summary Statistics

Table 2 provides the summary statistics on our variables of interest for the sample of S&P
500 firms from 1991 to 2008. We start with the KLD measures. The means of Total Strengths
and Total Concerns are about 2 and 1.6 respectively. Figure 1 shows the time trend of these
averages; both are increasing over time. Raw Goodness has a mean of .41 with a standard
deviation of about 2.4. Figure 2 shows the trend in Raw Goodness over time. It increases
during the early part of the sample, peaking in the late nineties and then it starts declining
and even becomes negative the last two years of the sample. Our analysis below differences
out this aggregate trend and hence it is not crucial to our analysis. But it is interesting to
note in passing that the aggregate goodness measure peaks during the dot-com period when
financial constraints were looser, consistent with the premise of our natural experiment. We
also show the means of the factor score variables, which have similar time trends to the raw
13

Lower quality ratings are assigned higher numerical scores. AAA bonds are 2; AA1 bonds are 3; AA2
bonds are 4; AA3 bonds are 5; A1 bonds are 6; A2 bonds are 7; A3 bonds are 8; BAA1 bonds are 9; BAA2
bonds are 10; BAA3 bonds are 11; BA1 bonds are 12; BA2 bonds are 13; BA3 bonds are 14; B1 bonds are
15; B2 bonds are 16; B3 bonds are 17; CAA1 bonds are 18 ; CAA2 bonds are 19; CAA3 bonds are 20; CA
bonds are 21; C bonds are 22; D bonds are 23.
14
We have also used the maximum and minimum bond rating for the firm in a year instead of the average
and obtain similar results to what is reported.
15
We first try to match bond ratings to KLD observations using CUSIPs. For KLD observations that are
not matched with bond information at this point, we then try to find their bond information matching on
firm name. Some observations are missing bond information because the firm had no outstanding bonds at
the time and others are missing because they were missed using this procedure.
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KLD measures.
The second part of Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the three financial constraint measures. In this data set, the financial constraint information is calculated using
firm information from the year before the KLD score.16 For all three measures, firms with
higher values are considered more constrained.

4.

Empirical Results

4.1.

Financial Constraints and Corporate Goodness

We begin our empirical work by taking a detailed look at how firm goodness varies with
financial constraints. Our model predicts that goodness should increase as firms become
less constrained. We examine the results of OLS regressions of firm goodness on our three
standard measures of financial constraints. These results are presented in Table 3. In Panel
A of Table 3, the dependent variable of the regressions is Raw Goodness; Factor Score
Goodness is the dependent variable in the regressions presented in Panel B. Besides the
financial constraint measures, also included in the regression specification are Year Effects,
Fama-French 49 Industry Effects and in the even-numbered columns Market Capitalization
Quintile Effects.
We start by looking at how firm goodness varies with KZ Score in the first two columns of
Panel A. In column (1), the coefficient on KZ Score is negative a statistically different from
zero, indicating that more constrained firms have less corporate goodness. The magnitude of
the coefficient suggests that easing a firm’s constraint with a one standard deviation decline
in KZ Score (-1.24) is associated with a .16 increase in Raw Goodness. There are several
ways to describe the size of this increase in Raw Goodness. For example, it is about 7% of the
standard deviation of Raw Goodness (2.42); also, it is about 15% of the standard deviation
of the yearly change in Raw Goodness (1.12). In column (2), Market Capitalization Quintile
16

In other words, the financial constraint measures are lagged one year.

15

Effects are added to the regression specification; the relationship between KZ Score and Raw
Goodness is almost identical to column (1), suggesting that our results are not being driven
by comparing relatively large and small S&P 500 firms.
The finanical constraint measure in the next two columns is No Repurchase Indicator. In
column (3) of Panel A, there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between
this constraint measure and Raw Goodness. The coefficient suggests that a firm doing no
repurchases the previous year has a Raw Goodness score that is about .23 lower than other
firms. This is about 10% of a standard deviation of Raw Goodness and about 20% of a
standard deviation of the yearly change in Raw Goodness. When Market Capitalization
Quintile Effects are added to the specification in column (4), the estimated relationship
between No Repurchase Indicator and Raw Goodness is slightly smaller but similar to column
(3).
The financial constraint of the final two columns is Average Bond Rating. In column
(5), there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between bond rating score
and Raw Goodness. The size of the coefficient indicates that a one standard deviation
improvement in bond rating quality (-2.90) is associated with a .45 increase in Raw Goodness.
This is about 19% of a standard deviation of Raw Goodness and about 37% of a standard
deviation of the yearly change in Raw Goodness. This relationship is qualitatively unchanged
when Market Cap Quintile Effects are added to the regression specification in the final
column.
Panel B of Table 3 is identical to Panel A, except that the dependent variable is Factor
Score Goodness instead of Raw Goodness. The pattern of results is very similar to Panel A.
Using all the different financial constraint measures, the results suggest that more financially
constrained firms have lower Factor Score Goodness. The magnitudes of these relationships
are also very similar to Panel A.
Taken together, Table 3 shows that financially constrained firms have less corporate
goodness. However, this does not necessarily mean that financial constraints are causing
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firms to produce less goodness. Other unobserved factors might be causing some firms to
be financially constrained and to have relatively little corporate goodness. Establishing
causality is a ubiquitious issue in the corporate responsibility literature. We next turn to
a natural experiment that we will argue will help us determine whether there is a causal
relationship between financial constraints and corporate responsibility.

4.2.

Natural Experiment

To determine the causality of the relationship between financial constraints and corporate
goodness, we need to find some exogenous variation in the financial constraints that firms
face and observe how this variation alters their corporate goodness decisions. Our candidate
for this exogenous variation is the technology bubble of the late 1990s. As argued in the
Introduction and the Model sections, during this period, it was easier for firms that were
constrained to raise funds only with equity to raise capital. Therefore, if there is a causal
relationship between financial constraints and corporate goodness, we expect that during this
period the negative relationship between financial constraints and corporate goodness should
be smaller than other periods. We now examine this relationship between the technology
bubble and sensitivity of financial constraints and corporate goodness using the KLD data
set.
Because our data sample is from 1991 to 2008, we have KLD information for S&P 500
firms before, during and after the tech bubble. We construct a difference-in-difference estimator comparing the sensitivity of financial constraints and corporate goodness during the
bubble to the sensitivity during the periods before and after the bubble. To do this, we
need to classify firms as constrained or not based on criteria that will not change over time
because of the Internet bubble. We construct measures of firm financial constraints based on
their constraint measures during 1991 and 1992: the first two years of our data. That is, we
will classify a firm over the entire sample based on their financial constraint measures during
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these two years, making this classification time invariant.17 We create three measures. Initial
KZ Score is the average KZ Score of a firm during 1991 and 1992. Initial No Repurchase
Indicator is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm did not have a repurchase in either of
those years. Finally, Initial Bond Rating is the average numerical rating of the firm’s bonds
in 1991 and 1992.
Table 4 shows summary statistics of the diff-in-diff data set. The sample includes S&P
500 non-technology firms that have observations in 1991 or 1992. We drop technology firms
from the sample because we worry that the Internet bubble might have affected the corporate
goodness of technology firms for reasons other than changes in their financial constraints.18
The summary statistics of the diff-in-diff sample is similar to the full sample presented in
Table 2.
The regression specification we estimate with this sample is one of our measures of corporate goodness on a measure of initial finanical constraint, a dummy variable for the observation being during the technology bubble, an interaction of these two variables and year
and firm fixed effects.19 Because the initial financial constraint variable is time invariant
and the technology bubble dummy has no cross-sectional variation, they cannot be uniquely
identified when year and firm fixed effects are included in the specification. The coefficient
of interest is on the interaction of the initial financial constraint variable and the technology
bubble dummy; it shows how the relationship between financial constraints and corporate
goodness is different during the Internet bubble compared to the rest of the sample.
Table 5 shows the diff-in-diff regression results for both of our measures of corporate
goodness and the three measures of initial financial constraints. As before, Panel A shows
the results with Raw Goodness as the dependent variable. The results in Panel B with
Factor Score Goodness as the dependent variable are similar. The first column uses Initial
17

Therefore, our sample for the diff-in-diff estimation will only include firms that we observe in 1991 and/or
1992.
18
We classify technology firms based on SIC codes. Firms with three digit SIC codes of 355, 357, 366, 367,
369, 381, 382 and 384 are considered technology firms.
19
The technology bubble period is defined as observations from 1996 through 2000.
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KZ Score as the financial constraint measure. The coefficient on the interaction term is
positive and statistically significant from zero, indicating that more financially constrained
firms have higher corporate goodness scores during the technology bubble compared to other
firms than other periods in the data sample. The magnitude of the interaction term is similar
in size but opposite signed to the average relationship between KZ Score and Raw Goodness
shown in Table 3, suggesting that the negative effect of KZ Score on corporate goodness
is roughly eliminated during the Internet bubble when traditional financial constraints are
relatively unimportant.
Column (2) shows the results when the financial constraint measure is Initial No Repurchase Indicator. As in column (1), the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and
statistically significant, showing that firms that did not repurchase have higher corporate
goodness scores compared to other firms during the Internet bubble compared to other periods. Again, the coefficient on the interaction is roughly similar in size but opposite signed to
the average effect of no repurchases on corporate goodness shown in Table 3, indicating that
during the technology bubble this constraint did not lower corporate goodness. Finally, column (3) shows the results using Initial Bond Rating as the measure of financial constraint. It
shows a very similar pattern to the results using the other two financial constraint measures.
These diff-in-diff results are consistent with a causal relationship between financial constraints and corporate goodness. When constraints exogenously relaxed for firms during
the technology bubble, more-constrained firms increased their corporate goodness relative to
less-constrained firms compared to other time periods. However, there are some important
assumptions we must make to interpret the diff-in-diff results as causal that we will now examine. The most important assumption of this methodology is that there is no other reason
why more financially constrained firms have more corporate goodness relative to other firms
during the Internet bubble compared to other periods besides the direct effect of the easing
the importance of financial constraints during the bubble. There are a few simple stories
that can be told in which this assumption might not hold; however, we are fortunate to have
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data to help determine whether these alternative stories are important.
One potential problem that is a concern when using a diff-in-diff methodology is that the
treatment and control groups might have different pre-existing time trends in the outcome
variable. In our context, it might be worrisome if more financially constrained and lessconstrained firms have differently evolving trends in corporate goodness over the period
of our sample. For example, if technology was changing so that corporate goodness was
increasing for more financially constrained firms over time relative to other firms, then a
diff-in-diff estimator might be capturing that pre-existing time trend instead of the causal
effect of the bubble.
Another potential problem with the diff-in-diff strategy involves attrition. Our sample
consists of S&P 500 firms with KLD and financial constraint information in 1991 or 1992.
Some of those firms disappear later in the sample. If there is differential attrition across
treatment and control groups that changes the average corporate goodness for those groups,
then the diff-in-diff estimator could be picking up this attrition effect instead of the causal
effect of easing financial constraints. For example, it might be that more financially constrained firms that spend a lot of resources on corporate goodness are financially vulnerable,
increasing the likelihood that they disappear later in the sample. Also, the technology bubble
might alter these attrition probabilities.
Luckily, our data set allows us to determine how important these potential problems
might be. Our data sample spans both sides of the technology bubble; that is, we have
a period before the Internet bubble (1991-1995), a period during the bubble (1996-2000)
and a period after the bubble (2001-2008). Therefore, we can calculate two diff-in-diff estimators. The first compares the sample before the technology bubble to the technology
bubble; the second compares the technology bubble period to the post-bubble period. If the
technology bubble estimator is measuring a causal effect of easing financial constraints on
corporate goodness, then we expect these two diff-in-diff estimators to produce similar estimates. If these potential problems are important, we expect the two estimators to produce
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substantially different results.
To see this, consider the example where there are different pre-existing trends in corporate goodness between more financially constrained and less-constrained firms: corporate
goodness is growing over time for more financially constrained firms compared to others
for reasons we cannot measure. The diff-in-diff estimator comparing the pre-bubble sample
to the bubble sample would produce a positive estimate of corporate goodness during the
bubble for financially constrained firms compared to others because of this time trend even
if there is no causal impact of the Internet bubble on corporate goodness. However, the
diff-in-diff estimator comparing the bubble sample to the post-bubble sample would produce
the opposite estimate. The time trend would cause the corporate goodness of financially
constrained firms to be lower compared to other firms during the technology bubble.
The attrition argument is a little more complicated. Consider the story where more
financially constrained firms that produce a lot of corporate goodness are financially vulnerable and this vulnerability is less important during the Internet bubble. The diff-in-diff
estimator comparing the technology bubble to the later sample might be problematic. After
the Internet bubble ends, these vulnerable firms are more likely to disappear, decreasing the
average corporate goodness of more financially constrained firms after the technology bubble
even if individual firms do not change their behavior. However, this should not be a problem
for the diff-in-diff that compares the pre-bubble sample to the bubble sample. During the
pre-bubble period, vulnerable firms are leaving the sample, decreasing the average corporate
goodness of financially constrained during this period. But when this attrition ends during
the technology bubble, this should not increase the average corporate goodness of financially
constrained firms (there is no sample replacement). If we observe an increase in corporate
goodness for more financially constrained firms compared to other firms during the bubble
compared to earlier, it cannot be driven by this type of attrition.
Table 6 presents the estimates of the two diff-in-diffs. We estimate them using both of our
corporate goodness measures and all three of our financial constraint measures. The odd-
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numbered columns show the diff-in-diff comparing the pre-bubble sample to the technology
bubble (Early). The even-numbered columns present the diff-in-diff using the technology
bubble and the post-bubble samples (Late). For all of the different combinations of goodness
and financial constraint measures, the estimates from the two diff-in-diffs are very similar.
Not surprisingly, the estimates of the coefficients of the interaction of financial constraints
and the technology bubble indicator are less precise than those presented in Table 5 because
of the smaller sample size. But there is no evidence of systematic differences between the
two diff-in-diff estimators consistent with concerns that our results are being driven by preexisting trends or sample attrition, buttressing the argument that the diff-in-diff estimators
are measuring a causal effect.
We plot how the goodness scores evolve for our two groups, the initial constrained versus
the unconstrained, using the three different measures of financial constraints, KZ in Figure
3, repurchases in Figure 4 and bond ratings in Figure 5. One can see that the growth of the
goodness scores for the initially constrained group grows much faster than the unconstrained
group in the dot-com period and then drops much faster after the dot-com period. These
figures attest graphically to the temporary convergence of the goodness scores of constrained
and unconstrained firms during the dot-com period, very much consistent with our theory.

4.3.

Decomposing Corporate Goodness

We have shown that financial constraints causally affect the corporate goodness of firms
using aggregate measures of corporate goodness. Next we turn to examining how these
constraints affect the components that make up the aggregate goodness measures. Both of
our aggregate goodness measures are functions of KLD strengths and concerns. We first
consider alternative measures of goodness that include only KLD strengths. We ask how
much of the relationship between financial constraints and corporate goodness is being driven
by only strengths.
We create two measures of corporate goodness based only on strengths: Total Strengths
22

and Factor Score Strengths. These are just the strength measures used to calculate Raw
Goodness and Factor Score Goodness. Table 7 presents the diff-in-diff estimates using these
two strength measures as dependent variable. That is, the regressions are identical to those
presented in Table 5, but the dependent variables are Total Strengths and Factor Score
Strengths instead of the aggregate goodness measures that use both strengths and concerns.
The coefficients on the interaction term of financial constraints and the technology bubble
indicator are all positive as they were in Table 5. However, all of the coefficients are smaller in
magnitude than those in Table 5, indicating that, although strengths do change as financial
constraints change, they are not the entire story. Concerns also play a role in the adjustment
of corporate goodness to financial constraints.
We next split up our measure of aggregate corporate goodness into its six components
and measure how financial constraints affect these components separately. The results are
presented in Table 8. Again, the specification is identical to the diff-in-diff model presented
in Table 5 except that the dependent variable is the difference of strengths and concerns
for the six KLD categories. Not surprisingly, the results are substantially less precise than
the results using the aggregate measure. The pattern of results suggests that financial
constraints have an effect on the behavior of firms across all of the categories except corporate
governance. Using any of the financial constraint measures, the effect of the technology
bubble on corporate governance behavior is always zero. Otherwise, the results suggest that
the aggregate effect of financial constraints on corporate goodness is not concentrated in
behavior in one or two KLD categories.
Finally, we investigate the effect of financial constraints on some of the KLD subcategories. There are several dozen sub-categories that make up the six categories we use to
create the aggregate goodness measure. For the vast majority of them, it is not possible to
find a precise relationship between financial constraints and whether firms have strengths and
concerns in these sub-categories. There are two strength sub-categories where we measure a
substantial effect of financial constraints on behavior; we show these results in Table 9. The
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first sub-category is an indicator for whether a firm provides substantial charitable giving;
this is a sub-category of the Community Relations category. The second is an indicator for
whether a firm has a cash profit-sharing program with its employees: a part of the Employee
Relations category. The diff-in-diff results in Table 9 show that the technology bubble had an
effect on the presence of both of these sub-categories, especially using the first two financial
constraint measures. One probably does not want to make too much of these results, but it
is interesting that both of these sub-categories involve management giving cash to outside
parties.

5.

Conclusion

In this paper, we develop a simple model to understand how corporate goodness varies
with financial constraints. The model predicts that less financially constrained firms ought
to spend more on goodness. We confirm this prediction empirically. These findings are
important in that they show that goodness is costly and goodness is a complement to profits.
These variables explain quite a bit of the variation in firm goodness. They also rule out a
number of explanations presented in the literature for corporate goodness.
Consumers and investors often take actions to induce firms to increase corporate goodness
(see, e.g., Barber (2007)). These include boycott of products or limits to investing in a firms’
equity or debt. Our findings suggest that smaller more financially constrained firms may
react differently to these inducements when compared to larger less constrained firms. We
plan to pursue some of these questions in future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. What determines the cut-off level of financial constraint at which the
firm will invest its first dollar in goodness? It has to be the point where the firm is indifferent
between allocating a dollar to goodness or allocating it to capital at Γ = Γ∗ and G = 0. Put
differently, the cut-off value Γ∗ solves the following equation

−u1 (αf (Γ∗ ) − Γ∗ , 0)αf 0 (Γ∗ ) + u2 (αf (Γ∗ ) − Γ∗ , 0) = 0,

(9)

where the first term is minus 1 times the marginal benefit of a dollar allocated to capital and
the second term is the marginal benefit of allocating a dollar to goodness. Because f 0 (0) = ∞
and u2 (·, 0) < ∞ the left-hand side of equation (9) equals −∞ at Γ∗ = 0. In addition, from
the assumption expressed by (6), the left-hand side of (9) is positive at Γ∗ = K F B < ΓF B .
Furthermore, differentiating the equation (9) with respect to Γ∗ one obtains
00

−u11 (αf 0 (Γ∗ ) − 1)αf 0 (Γ∗ ) + u21 (αf 0 (Γ∗ ) − 1) − u1 αf (Γ∗ ) > 0,

because αf 0 (Γ∗ ) > 1 and u11 < u12 . Hence there is a unique Γ∗ < K F B < ΓF B such that
equation (9) holds.
Moreover, in Region 2 an increase in Γ leads to an increase in both output and goodness.
In fact, here G = Γ − K and thus

u1 (αf (K) − Γ, Γ − K)αf 0 (K) − u2 (αf (K) − Γ, Γ − K) = 0

(10)

∂K
(−u11 + u12 )αf 0 − u22 + u21
=−
.
∂Γ
u11 α2 (f 0 )2 − u12 αf 0 − u21 αf 0 + u22 + u1 αf 00

(11)

Thus

Notice that the first four terms of the denominator forms a quadratic form:

(−αf 0 , 1) ∗ D2 u ∗ (−αf 0 , 1)0 < 0
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Because D2 u < 0, it follows that the first four terms are less than zero and so is the fifth
term u1 αf 00 by concavity of the production function. Now consider the numerator. Because
αf 0 ≥ 1 and u11 < u12
(−u11 + u12 )αf 0 − u22 + u21 > −u11 + u12 − u22 + u21 > 0

again from using
−(1, −1) ∗ D2 u ∗ (1, −1)0 > 0
(i.e. the negative of the quadratic form on with a negative definite matrix is positive). Hence
we have 0 <

∂K
.
∂Γ

Furthermore using αf 0 > 1 and again the inequality u11 < u12 , we can show

that
∂K
< 1.
∂Γ
This is equivalent to showing that

u11 α2 (f 0 )2 − u12 αf 0 − u21 αf 0 + u2 2 < (u1 1 − u1 2)αf 0 + u22 − u21

(i.e. the denominator is bigger in absolute value than the numerator, or that the denominator
is more negative than the numerator is more negative). This is equivalent to

(u1 1αf 0 − u21 )αf 0 < u11 αf 0 − u21

To summarize, Γ ≤ Γ∗ defines Region 3. In this region, the optimal K = Γ and the
optimal G = 0, since the right hand side of (9) is negative. Region 2 is defined as Γ∗ < Γ <
ΓF B . In this region financial constraints bind, but G > 0 and an increase in Γ leads to an
increase in both output and goodness. Finally, Region 1 is where Γ ≥ ΓF B , and firms choose
the first best.
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Table 1: Factor Loadings of the
First Factor of Strengths and Concerns
The entries are the factor loadings on the components of strengths
and concerns from factor analysis. These loadings are used to create
the variables Factor Score Strengths and Factor Score Concerns.

Panel A: Strengths
Total Environmental Strengths

.19

Total Corporate Governance Strengths

-.01

Total Community Strengths

.34

Total Diversity Strengths

.51

Total Product Quality Strengths

.36

Total Employee Relation Strengths

.39

Panel B: Concerns
Total Environmental Concerns

.21

Total Corporate Governance Concerns

.18

Total Community Concerns

.23

Total Diversity Concerns

.19

Total Product Quality Concerns

.26

Total Employee Relation Concerns

.22
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Main Data Set
The entries are summary statistics of the data set used to measure the relationship between firm financial
constraints and corporate goodness. The sample consists of yearly observations of S&P 500 firms from
1991 to 2008 that can be matched to corporate responsibility information from KLD and data from
Compustat and CRSP to calculate financial constraint information. There are 6798 observations. Total
Strengths is the sum of strengths a firm has in a year (measured consistently across years). Total
Concerns is the sum of concerns a firm has in a year (measured consistently across years). Raw Goodness
is the difference of Total Strengths and Total Concerns. Factor Score Strengths is the first factor score
from a factor analysis of the components of strengths. Factor Score Concerns is the first factor score from
a factor analysis of the components of concerns. Factor Score Goodness is the difference of Factor Score
Strengths and Factor Score Concerns. KZ Score is a linear combination of a firm’s cash flow, dividends,
cash balances, book leverage and Tobin’s Q measured the previous year. Higher KZ Score is associated
with more financial constraints. No Repurchase Indicator is a dummy for the firm not having any
repurchases the previous year. Average Bond Rating is the average Moody rating of the firm’s bonds the
previous year. Higher values are associated with lower credit quality. Standard deviations are in brackets.

Mean

25th Percentile

Median

75th Percentile

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Total Strengths

2.01
[2.02]

0

1

3

Total Concerns

1.60
[1.91]

0

1

2

Raw Goodness

.41
[2.42]

-1

0

2

Factor Score Strengths

-.00
[.68]

-.67

-.13

.30

Factor Score Concerns

.02
[.77]

-.47

-.19

.33

Factor Score Goodness

-.02
[.88]

-.51

.03

.46

.86
[1.24]

.26

.85

1.45

6.73

8.00

10.00

Raw KLD Measures

Factor Scores of KLD Measures

Financial Constraint Measures
KZ Score
No Repurchase Indicator
Average Bond Rating

.33
8.42
[2.90]
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Table 3: OLS Estimates of the Relationship between Financial Constraints and Corporate Goodness
The entries are OLS regression coefficients measuring the relationship between financial constraints and corporate goodness.
In Panel A, the dependent variable of the regressions is Raw Goodness; the dependent variable in Panel B is Factor Score
Goodness. In the first two columns, the financial constraint measure is KZ Score. The financial constraint measure in
columns (3) and (4) is No Repurchase Indicator, and Average Bond Rating is the financial constraint measure of the last two
columns. Year Effects and Fama-French 49 Industry Effects are included in all the specifications. Also, Market Cap Quintile
Effects are included in the specifications shown in the even-numbered columns. Standard errors are in parentheses and are
clustered to account for the potential correlation of multiple observations of the same firm across years.

Panel A: Raw Goodness
KZ Score

No Repurchase

Bond Rating

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

-.130
(.046)

-.112
(.045)

-.225
(.089)

-.169
(.086)

-.156
(.028)

-.150
(.033)

Year Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Market Cap Quintile Effects

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

7500

7500

7922

7922

5904

5904

Financial Constraint Measure

Observations
Panel B: Factor Score Goodness

KZ Score

No Repurchase

Bond Rating

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

-.063
(.017)

-.061
(.016)

-.055
(.032)

-.053
(.032)

-.052
(.011)

-.064
(.012)

Year Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Market Cap Quintile Effects

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

7500

7500

7922

7922

5904

5904

Financial Constraint Measure

Observations
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Table 4: Summary Statistics of Bubble Difference-in-Difference Sample
The entries are summary statistics of the data set used to estimate how the tech bubble affected the
relationship between financial constraints and corporate goodness. The sample consists of yearly
observations of non-tech S&P 500 firms from 1991 to 2008 that have observations in 1991 and/or 1992 and
can be matched to corporate responsibility information from KLD and data from Compustat and CRSP to
calculate financial constraint information. Raw Goodness and Factor Score Goodness are defined as
before. The financial constraint measures are measured in 1991 and 1992. Initial KZ Score is the average
KZ Score of the firm during those two years. Initial No Repurchase Indicator is a dummy variable for the
firm having no repurchases in either 1991 or 1992. Initial Bond Rating is the average bond rating of the
firm during those two years. Standard deviations are in brackets.

Mean

25th Percentile

Median

75th Percentile

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Raw Goodness

.39
[2.44]

-1

0

2

Factor Score Goodness

.01
[.88]

-.48

.03

.57

.48
[1.29]

-.04

.50

1.18

5.86

7.03

9.00

Goodness Measures

Financial Constraint Measures
Initial KZ Score
Initial No Repurchase Indicator
Initial Bond Rating

.55
7.45
[2.83]
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Table 5: The Effect of the Tech Bubble on the Relationship between
Financial Constraints and Corporate Goodness
The entries are OLS regression coefficients measuring how the tech bubble affected the relationship
between financial constraints and corporate goodness. In Panel A, the dependent variable of the
regressions is Raw Goodness; the dependent variable in Panel B is Factor Score Goodness. Financial
Constraint is one of the three measures of the firm’s initial financial condition: Initial KZ Score, Initial
No Repurchase Indicator and Initial Bond Rating. Bubble Indicator is a dummy that the observation is
between 1996 and 2000. Because Year Effects and Firm Fixed Effects are included in the regression
specifications, the coefficients for Bubble Indicator and the initial financial state of the firms are not
uniquely identified. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered to account for the correlation of
observations of a firm over time.

Panel A: Raw Goodness
KZ Score

No Repurchase

Bond Rating

(1)

(2)

(3)

.165
(.050)

.285
(.144)

.102
(.032)

Year Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Firm Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

5039

5288

3999

KZ Score

No Repurchase

Bond Rating

(1)

(2)

(3)

.056
(.018)

.097
(.053)

.040
(.012)

Year Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Firm Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

5039

5288

3999

Financial Constraint Bubble Indicator

Panel B: Factor Score Goodness

Financial Constraint Bubble Indicator
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Table 6: Robustness Checks of the Difference-in-Difference Estimates
The entries are coefficients of OLS regressions measuring how the tech bubble affected the relationship between financial constraints and
corporate goodness using different samples. The regressions are identical to those presented in Table 5 except that the results shown in the
odd-numbered columns include observations from 1991 to 2000 (Early) and the results shown in the even-numbered columns include
observations from 1996 to 2008 (Late). Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered to account for the correlation of observations of
a firm over time.

Panel A: Raw Goodness
KZ Score

No Repurchase

Bond Rating

Early

Late

Early

Late

Early

Late

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

.152
(.056)
Yes

.172
(.100)
Yes

.335
(.164)
Yes

.252
(.228)
Yes

.100
(.036)
Yes

.094
(.061)
Yes

Firm Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

3386

2826

3543

2971

2689

2242

Financial Constraint Bubble Indicator
Year Effects

Panel B: Factor Score Goodness
KZ Score

No Repurchase

Bond Rating

Early

Late

Early

Late

Early

Late

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

.046
(.019)
Yes

.068
(.037)
Yes

.137
(.060)
Yes

.058
(.087)
Yes

.044
(.013)
Yes

.033
(.023)
Yes

Firm Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

3386

2826

3543

2971

2689

2242

Financial Constraint Bubble Indicator
Year Effects
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Table 7: The Effect of the Tech Bubble on the Relationship between
Financial Constraints and Corporate Strengths
The entries are OLS regression coefficients measuring how the tech bubble affected the relationship
between financial constraints and corporate strengths. The regression specifications are identical to those
presented in Table 5 except that the dependent variable in Panel A is Total Strengths and the dependent
variable in Panel B is Factor Score Strengths. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered to
account for the correlation of observations of a firm over time.

Panel A: Total Strengths
KZ Score

No Repurchase

Bond Rating

(1)

(2)

(3)

.060
(.038)
Yes

.171
(.109)
Yes

.053
(.024)
Yes

Firm Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

5039

5288

3999

KZ Score

No Repurchase

Bond Rating

(1)

(2)

(3)

.024
(.013)
Yes

.060
(.037)
Yes

.019
(.008)
Yes

Firm Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

5039

5288

3999

Financial Constraint Bubble Indicator
Year Effects

Panel B: Factor Score Strengths

Financial Constraint Bubble Indicator
Year Effects
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Table 8: Exploring the Effect of the Tech Bubble
on Corporate Goodness by Category
The entries are OLS regression coefficients measuring how the tech bubble affected the relationship
between financial constraints and corporate goodnesss. The regression specifications are identical to
those presented in Table 5 except that the dependent variable in each panel is a different category of
corporate goodness: Environmental, Corporate Governance, Community, Diversity, Product Quality and
Employee Relations. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered to account for the correlation
of observations of a firm over time.

Panel A: Environmental
KZ Score

No Repurchase

Bond Rating

(1)

(2)

(3)

.019
(.026)

.103
(.064)

.023
(.015)

Year Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Firm Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

5039

5288

3999

KZ Score

No Repurchase

Bond Rating

(1)

(2)

(3)

-.004
(.004)
Yes

-.001
(.011)
Yes

-.001
(.002)
Yes

Firm Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

5039

5288

3999

KZ Score

No Repurchase

Bond Rating

(1)

(2)

(3)

.010
\(.016)
Yes

.050
(.044)
Yes

.008
(.010)
Yes

Firm Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

5039

5288

3999

Financial Constraint Bubble Indicator

Panel B: Corporate Governance

Financial Constraint Bubble Indicator
Year Effects

Panel C: Community

Financial Constraint Bubble Indicator
Year Effects
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Table 8 (cont.)
Panel D: Diversity
KZ Score

No Repurchase

Bond Rating

(1)

(2)

(3)

.012
(.023)

.063
(.068)

.016
(.013)

Year Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Firm Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

5039

5288

3999

KZ Score

No Repurchase

Bond Rating

(1)

(2)

(3)

.056
(.020)
Yes

.031
(.056)
Yes

.033
(.013)
Yes

Firm Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

5039

5288

3999

KZ Score

No Repurchase

Bond Rating

(1)

(2)

(3)

.073
(.028)
Yes

.038
(.067)
Yes

.021
(.015)
Yes

Firm Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

5039

5288

3999

Financial Constraint Bubble Indicator

Panel E: Product Quality

Financial Constraint Bubble Indicator
Year Effects

Panel F: Employee Relations

Financial Constraint Bubble Indicator
Year Effects
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Table 9: Exploring the Effect of the Tech Bubble on the Presence of
Particular Corporate Strengths
The entries are OLS regression coefficients measuring how the tech bubble affected the relationship
between financial constraints and corporate strengths. The regression specifications are identical to those
presented in Table 5 except that the dependent variable in Panel A is Indicator for Charitable Giving
Strength and the dependent variable in Panel B is Indicator for Cash Profit Sharing Strength. Standard
errors are in parentheses and are clustered to account for the correlation of observations of a firm over
time.

Panel A: Charitable Giving
KZ Score

No Repurchase

Bond Rating

(1)

(2)

(3)

.012
(.007)

.056
(.022)

.001
(.005)

Year Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Firm Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

5039

5288

3999

KZ Score

No Repurchase

Bond Rating

(1)

(2)

(3)

.021
(.010)

.045
(.024)

.007
(.006)

Year Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Firm Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

5039

5288

3999

Financial Constraint Bubble Indicator

Panel B: Cash Profit Sharing with Employees

Financial Constraint Bubble Indicator
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Figure 1: Time Trend of Corporate Strengths and Concerns
The figure shows the time trend in the yearly average Total Strengths and Total Concerns of S&P 500
firms between 1991 and 2008.
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Figure 2: Time Trend of Corporate Goodness
The figure shows the time trend in the yearly average Raw Goodness of S&P 500 firms between 1991 and
2008.
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Figure 3: Trends in Average Corporate Goodness by Initial KZ Score
The figure shows the time trend in the yearly average of corporate goodness for two groups of firms. The
first group is firms in the bottom half of the Initial KZ Score distribution. These are relatively
unconstrained firms. The second group is firms in the top half of this distribution; these are relatively
constrained firms.
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Figure 4: Trends in Average Corporate Goodness by Initial Repurchases
The figure shows the time trend in the yearly average of corporate goodness for two groups of firms. The
first group is firms with a value of zero for Initial No Repurchase Indicator. These are relatively
unconstrained firms. The second group is firms with a value of one for this variable; these are relatively
constrained firms.
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Figure 5: Trends in Average Corporate Goodness by Initial Bond Rating
The figure shows the time trend in the yearly average of corporate goodness for two groups of firms. The
first group is firms in the bottom half of the Initial Bond Rating distribution. These are relatively
unconstrained firms. The second group is firms in the top half of this distribution; these are relatively
constrained firms.
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